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Abstract
Joan Roughgarden proposed a theory called social selection as a behav-
ioral game theoretic model for sexual reproduction that incorporates both
competition and cooperation in 2006. (Roughgarden et al., 2006) Players os-
cillate between playing competitively to maximize their individual fitness,
leading to a Nash Competitive Equilibrium, and playing cooperatively to
maximize a team fitness function, leading to a Nash Bargaining Solution.
Roughgarden et al. (2006) gives rates of change for both the competitive
state and the cooperative state, but does not explain her rates or how to
switch between the states in sufficient detail.
We test and rederive the rates, critiquing an assumption that the deriva-
tion of such a rate must make, as well as create a probabilistic model that
switches between the two states. We test our model on the reproductive be-
haviors of Symphodus tinca, the peacock wrasse. The results follow the tra-
jectory of the reproductive strategies for the wrasse throughout the breed-
ing system, suggesting that cooperation could be a mechanism through
which wrasse change their reproductive behaviors. However, the inputs
to the model need to be analyzed more critically. Future work could in-
clude deriving rates for competitive play and cooperative play that do not
rely on assumptions of being able to quantify strategy allocation proportion
and refining the model and drawing generalized conclusions about it.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we explain social selection as a game theoretic model for
sexual reproduction. We also give some game theory background on basic
payoff matrices, competitive games, the Nash Equilibrium, noncompetitive
games, and the Nash Bargaining Solution. We end by applying the Nash
Equilibrium and the Nash Bargaining Solution to an example.
Joan Roughgarden describes possible mechanisms through which bar-
gaining occurs in her model (Roughgarden et al., 2006). An explanation of
Rubinstein’s sequential bargaining model as another possible schema for
the dynamics of bargaining is included in this chapter as well (1982).
1.1 What Is Social Selection?
Darwin’s original theory of sexual selection proposed that sexual reproduc-
tion is a competitive game. Individuals of the same sex compete with each
other for mates, and an individual of the opposite sex chooses the winner
of the competition on the basis that that winner has more desirable genes.
There are many species that this theory does not model well. For exam-
ple, oystercatchers are a type of bird that has threesomes guarding nests,
usually two females and one male. The females might compete with each
other, or they might work together to take care of the chicks and guard the
nest.
Roughgarden et al. (2006) proposed an alternate theory to sexual se-
lection called social selection, which is based on cooperative game theory.
Players, which are individuals within a species, communicate with each
other through threats and side payments. The payoff is “reproductive fit-
ness”.
2 Introduction
She sets up a two-tier model, the first of which is the evolutionary tier
and the second of which is a behavioral tier. At the evolutionary tier, nat-
ural selection prevails to increase the diversity and longevity of the entire
species, and at the behavioral tier, individuals within a species cooperate
and compete with each other to increase either their individual fitnesses or
their team fitness. The behavioral tier is the one based on cooperative game
theory.
A cooperative game is defined as a game in which communication is al-
lowed and players can make binding agreements. A noncooperative or
competitive game is one in which players seek to maximize their individual
utility without communication. Teams are defined as groups of individuals
that work towards a common goal. This is different from a coalition, which
is a group of individuals who have coincident self-interests. Finally, the
underlying motivation behind players choosing to play the game coopera-
tively is “pleasure”, based on empirical observations according to Rough-
garden et al. (2006). Animals will arrive at a Nash Bargaining Solution
through maximizing a common objective function through pleasure-based
teamwork.
Social selection is hence a two-tier theory where individuals switch be-
tween cooperative and competitive behavior in order to maximize repro-
ductive fitness so that the diversity and longevity of the species is increased.
1.2 Background: Game Theory
We can think of game theory as the mathematical theory of decision-making.
Each game has a set of players who choose between a set of strategies. Based
on the strategies these players choose, they end up with different payoffs.
Players act to maximize these payoffs.
In biological interactions, players are individual animals, while payoffs
would be the fitness conferred upon these animals. One can think of fitness
as likelihood of survival, or survival of offspring.
The payoffs and strategies for a two player, n-strategy game can easily
be visualized by a payoff matrix. The one below is an example from Straffin
(1996), which will be used later on as well.
The payoffs are the entries of the matrix. These payoffs are represented
in pairs, where the first value in the pair is the payoff to Player 1, and the
second value in the pair is the payoff to Player 2.
In a competitive game, a win for one player is a loss for the other. An
important concept in competitive game theory is that of the Nash Equilib-
Nash Bargaining 3
Player 2
A B
Player 1
A (2, 6) (10, 5)
B (4, 8) (0, 0)
Table 1.1 Straffin two-by-two matrix.
Player 2
A B
Player 1
A (2, 6) (6, 9)
B (4, 8) (0, 0)
Table 1.2 Bargaining two-by-two matrix.
rium. A Nash Equilibrium is a pair of strategies that gives neither player an
incentive to deviate. In other words, two players are at a Nash Equilibrium
if neither player can do better by switching their chosen strategy.
In Table 1.1, there exists a Nash Equilibrium when Player 1 plays B and
Player 2 plays A for a payoff of (4, 8). If Player 1 switches to strategy A
while Player 2 remains at A, then their payoff will decrease to 2. If Player
2 switches to strategy B while Player 2 remains at B, then their payoff will
decrease to 0. Hence, neither player can do better by switching their chosen
strategy.
1.3 Nash Bargaining
If players are able to communicate and make agreements, then the Nash
Equilibrium may not be as good of a solution concept. Perhaps players
can bargain and make side payments to reach a more optimal solution. For
example, with Table 1.1, if players could bargain, then Player 1 might notice
that they could increase their payoff if they could induce Player 2 to play
strategy B while they played strategy A. To accomplish this, they might
offer Player 2 a side payment of 4 to play strategy B. In this case, the new
payoff matrix would be:
We see that in this new payoff matrix there are at least two Nash Equilib-
ria, (Player 1-A, Player 2-B) and (Player 1-B, Player 2-A). (Player 1-B, Player
2-A) is the Nash equilibrium from the example above. For (Player 1-A,
Player 2-B), we see that if Player 1 switches to strategy B then their payoff
will decrease to 0, and if Player 2 switches to strategy A then their pay-
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off will decrease to 2. However, the two Nash Equilibria are not the same:
(Player 1-A, Player 2-B) yields a higher payoff than (Player 1-B, Player 2-A).
In any game, players can play mixed strategies by partitioning time into
playing certain strategies to maximize their individual payoffs. For exam-
ple, if we imagine that Table 1.1 is a repeated game, then Player 1 could
play strategy A 40% of the time, and strategy B the other 60% of the time.
Assuming Player 2 plays strategy A, Player 1 gets a payoff of
0.4× 2+ 0.6× 4 = 0.08+ 0.24 = 0.32,
and assuming Player 2 plays strategy B, Player 1 gets a payoff of
0.4× 10+ 0.6× 0 = 0.4.
Nash came up with a solution concept called the Nash Bargaining Solution
to determine how players should make these partitions in a cooperative
game.
First we explain how bargaining is modeled. Suppose two players are
bargaining over something. Then there exists a set of outcomes S that their
bargaining might attain. This set S is called the bargaining set. Each player
i has a utility scale ui that ranks the outcomes that they prefer. The players
bargain to try to get the most preferable outcome for themselves.
There exists an outcome d1 for player 1 and d2 for player 2 that are
their least preferable outcomes on their respective utility scales. The point
(d1, d2) is the threat point, that is the outcome in the event that players are
unable to reach an agreement.
Nash made four assumptions about the nature of the bargaining solu-
tion called the Nash Bargaining Axioms. If these four axioms are satisfied,
then there exists a unique solution to the bargaining problem. Let f (d, S)
represent a solution to the bargaining problem where S is the bargaining
set and d is the threat point.
Axiom 1: Invariance to Affine Transformations. A solution is invariant
to affine transformations of utilities. In other words, a player’s preference
doesn’t change based on the scale. If Player 1 prefers outcome x to out-
come y, then they will always prefer outcome x to outcome y no matter
what scale is used. Hence the solution should not be affected by an affine
transformation in the utilities.
Mathematically, this says that if T1 : R2 → R2 is an affine linear trans-
formation
T1(x, y) = (ax+ b, y),
Nash Bargaining Dynamics 5
Figure 1.1 Payoff polygon for the game. Threat point is the light blue dot.
Taken from Straffin (1996) and modified.
then
T1( f (d, S)) = f (T1(d), T1(S)).
Axiom 2: Pareto Optimality. There should not be a solution that yields
a better outcome for both players.
Axiom 3: Symmetry. If the set of outcomes S is symmetric with respect
to the main diagonal and if d1 = d2, then the solution should assign equal
utilities to both players.
Axiom 4: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If a solution s =
f (T, d) is found in a set of outcomes T, then any subset S ⊂ T containing
s should still have s as the solution. In other words, the presence other
alternatives are irrelevant to the solution.
Mathematically, this says that if S ⊂ T and f (T, d) ∈ S, then f (T, d) =
f (S, d).
If Axiom 2 is satisfied, then the solution must exist along a set to the
upper right of the threat point, known as the negotiation set:
It is known that the Nash bargaining solution is the unique point on
that maximizes the product
(x− d1)(y− d2)
where (x, y) ∈ S, x ≥ d1, y ≥ d2.
1.4 Nash Bargaining Dynamics
The Nash Bargaining Solution provides a very useful concept for the solu-
tion two players will reach, but it does not explain the dynamics of how
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players might arrive at the solution. It is known as a static solution. Rough-
garden proposed a possible schema for the evolutionary dynamics of social
selection, which we analyze in the following sections. Two other authors,
Rubinstein and Binmore, have also worked extensively on bargaining dy-
namics in economics (Rubinstein, 1982; Binmore et al., 1986), and the fol-
lowing is an overview of their work.
1.4.1 Rubinstein’s Strategic Bargaining Model
Suppose there are two individuals who would like to divide up a pie of
size 1. Each makes a proposal at discrete time intervals as to how the pie
should be divided sequentially. Then if player 1 gets x of the pie player 2
will get 1− x of the pie. Furthermore, time is valuable to the players, so
that as time increases the player has more incentive to make a deal. The
preferences of each player are also continuous and stationary, or,
1. A player’s preferences can be written as a lottery between that player’s
most extreme preferences, and
2. The preference of (x, t) over (y, t+ 1) if x and y are outcomes and t is
time is independent of t.
Rubinstein seeks to answer the question of what agreement will be if both
parties behave rationally.
Two more conditions can be added for two different sub-families of
models:
• Fixed bargaining cost: Player i’s preference is given by the function
y− cit where ci is a constant, so every player has a fixed cost for each
bargaining step.
• Fixed discounting factor: Player i’s preference is given by the function
yδti where δi is a constant, so every player has a proportional discount
for each bargaining step.
A final assumption is that the players have complete information about
the preferences of the others.
The main thrust of the paper is that a Nash equilibrium is inadequate
as a way to decide how the pie will be partitioned, as every possible parti-
tion is a Nash equilibrium. Hence the author defines a Perfect Equilibrium
Partition (PEP) as a unique solution; a PEP is a pair of strategies such that
the player who has to continue the bargaining has no better strategy than
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to follow the planned strategy. In other words, a PEP is a pair of strategies
such that if a player plans to accept an offer, then they have no better alter-
native than to accept the offer, and if a player plans to reject an offer, then
they have no better alternative than to reject the offer. There exists a unique
PEP for most cases.
The outcomes are as follows. With fixed bargaining cost,
1. If c1 > c2, the PEP is that player 1 gets c2 of the pie.
2. If c1 = c2, then any partition of the pie where player 1 gets at least
c1, or any partition x such that c1 ≤ x ≤ 1 is a perfect equilibrium
partition. In other words, player 1 cannot do better than getting c1 of
the pie, and player 2 cannot do worse than getting 1− c1 of the pie.
3. If c1 < c2, then player 1 gets all of the pie.
With the fixed discounting factor model, if one of the δi is strictly less
than 1, and if at least one of the δi is strictly positive, then the player who
starts the bargainin gets 1−δ21−δ1δ2 . This solution is continuous and monotonic
in the discounting factors, and the player who starts the bargaining gets the
relative advantage.
1.4.2 Strategic Bargaining Solution Approximates Nash Bargain-
ing Solutions
Binmore et al. (1986) attempted to clarify how Rubinstein’s strategic bar-
gaining model and the Nash bargaining solution were related. In a two-
person bargaining situation, the set X represents possible agreements, and
x ∈ X represents the payoffs for each player. There are also utility functions
for both players, rating either their attitudes towards risk or their attitudes
towards time, as well as certain conditions relating to the bargaining proce-
dure (who makes the first offer and at what times?) and environment (can
the process be interrupted by random events?).
The authors deal with two basic motives that would lead to bargaining
rather than competition. The first is the players’ desire to maximize their
individual payoffs in minimal time, and the second is their desire to avoid
the consequences of not reaching agreement. One can think of it as the
desire to not minimize their individual payoffs.
Static problems are without consideration for how the offers are made.
This paper elaborates on the strategic model used in Rubinstein (1982) by
incorporating the two motives to get two different models, then showing
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that the Nash bargaining solution approximates the perfect equilibrium in
each model. However, the two motives lead to different agreements with
respect to the underlying set X of physical consequences to the two parties,
as the utility functions are different.
For a description of the strategic bargaining model, see the Rubinstein
commentary.
The conclusion is that if the bargaining situation is different then the
Nash bargaining solution is still valid given that the model is set up cor-
rectly. This involves careful construction of the set S of utility functions,
the set s0 of the threat point, the symmetry axiom, and addition of other
assumptions.
1.4.3 Time Preference
We look at the strategic bargaining model where the players value time in
reaching agreement. Suppose two players are trying to divide up a pie of
size 1. Let
X = {(x1, x2)|x1, x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 ≤ 1}
represent the set of possible agreements for dividing up this pie. Then x1
is the proportion of pie player 1 gets and x2 is the proportion of pie player
2 gets. Let d be the outcome when the players never reach an agreement.
Bargaining is made at discrete time intervals 0,∆, 2∆, 3∆, . . . where ∆ is the
length of a single bargaining period.
Let an agreement be defined as (x, t), where x is a partition of the pie
(so x ∈ X) and t = n∆ is the time at which the agreement is reached. Let
A ≡i B mean that player i is indifferent between A and B. Furthermore,
assume that there are time-indifferent agreements, or there exists g ∈ X
and τ = n∆ such that (g, τ) ≡i (g, 0) (the set X must be large enough to
have such an agreement). Additional assumptions are,
• Stationarity. If (x, τ) ≥i (y, τ + v), then (x, τ′) ≥i (y, τ′ + v).
• Montonicity in time. If τ < τ′ then (x, τ) >i (x, τ′).
• Continuity. A player’s preferences can be written as a lottery between
that player’s most extreme preferences.
• Concavity of compensation. Both players are risk-averse.
Then from Rubinstein (1982), there exists x∗, y∗ ∈ X such that (x∗,∆) ≡1
(y∗, 0) and (y∗,∆) ≡2 (x∗, 0). If both players prefer x∗ and y∗ to g and d,
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then there is a unique perfect equilibrium - player 1 refuses anything below
y∗ and always demands x∗ and player 2 refuses anything above x∗ and
always demands y∗.
If player 1 starts then the equilibrium outcome is (x∗, 0) and if player 2
starts then it is (y∗, 0).

Chapter 2
Roughgarden’s Model
In this chapter we give an overview of the model Roughgarden et al. (2006)
developed for social selection. We describe the specific parameters, vari-
ables, and rates in her model, as well as where it draws from game theory.
We end up with an application of her model to an example.
2.1 The Model
In Roughgarden’s model, time is a variable (Roughgarden et al., 2006). Pro-
portions of time are spent playing strategies, and are continually adjusted
as players attempt to maximize either individual fitness or cooperative fit-
ness.
Consider a two-player, two-strategy game. There exists a 2× 2 payoff
matrix for this game. Let wij, k represent that payoff for Player k when
Player 1 plays Strategy i and Player 2 plays Strategy j. As an example,
consider the example from Straffin (1996) once again:
Player 2
A B
Player 1
A (2, 6) (10, 5)
B (4, 8) (0, 0)
In this case, wAA,1 = 2 and wAA,2 = 6.
In individual play, players play strategies that attempt to maximize
their own individual fitness independent of the other players’ fitness. Let
p1(t), p2(t) be the proportion of time player 1 and player 2 play strategy A,
respectively. Then 1− p1(t) and 1− p2(t) is the proportion of time player
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1 and player 2 play strategy B, respectively. Let wi(p1, p2) represent the
expected individual fitness for player i given p1, p2; that is,
wi(p1, p2) = p1p2wAA,i + p1(1− p2)wAB,i
+ (1− p1)p2wBA,i + (1− p1)(1− p2)wBB,i.
The rate of change at which player i changes playing strategy A is similar
to that for coevolution between two species:
dpi
dt
=
1
wi(p1, p2)
(
∂wi(p1, p2)
∂pi
)
× pi(1− pi).
Roughgarden et al. (2006) gave no other justification for the rate besides
mentioning coevolution, and cited no other references. The intuition we
developed is that the direction of the strategy change will depend on the
partial of the fitness as the strategy changes. The rate of change will not be
very large if the fitness at that point is very large already, and the rate of
change will also not be very large if the strategy time allocations are near 0
or 1 because it will take a while for the individuals to adjust their strategy
time allocation, similar to population genetics. However, this analogy to
population genetics seems dubious, as these are individuals rather than
populations. These rates are explored more rigorously in Chapter 3.
In team play, both players attempt to maximize team fitness, defined
as the product of each player’s individual fitness given the threat point.
Let xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB be the proportion of the time the players jointly play
AA, AB, BA, and BB respectively, and let vi be the threat point to player i.
Then the individual expected fitness for player i is
wi(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB) = xAA(wAA,i − vi) + xAB(wAB,i − vi)
+ xBA(wBA,i − vi) + xBB(wBB,i − vi). (2.1)
The team fitness is hence
w1(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)w2(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB).
The rate of change for a joint strategy xij (where ij ∈ AA, AB, BA, BB) is
similar to that of evolution within a single species:
dxij
dt
=
1
w1(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)w2(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)
×
{
∂∗[w1(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)w2(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)]
∂∗xij
}
× xij(1− xij).
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Bird 2
Forage Guard
Bird 1 Forage (2, 6) (10, 5)
Guard (4, 8) (0, 0)
Table 2.1 Bird matrix.
2.2 Example: Birds Raising Chicks
Recall the payoff matrix from Straffin (1996) used above. We will use it
as an example and interpret it to be a biological game. Suppose we have
two birds, Bird 1 and Bird 2 that are attempting to raise a nest of chicks
together. They each have two strategies, either to forage for food or to
guard the nest. This results in a payoff matrix of Table 2.1. If both birds
guard the nest, then no one will get food, hence all of their offspring will
die, resulting in the payoff of (0, 0). Otherwise, both birds will get different
fitness payoffs in terms of what is pleasurable to them, which is dependent
on offspring survival but also on their individual willingness to forage or
guard. The Nash Equilibria are at (Guard, Forage) and (Forage, Guard).
At those points, neither bird has an incentive to change strategies, because
their fitnesses will drop accordingly.
Each bird might notice that they enjoy foraging more than guarding,
and hence negotiate an arrangement to divide time foraging and guard-
ing. This could be reached by threat point — Bird 1 could threaten to go
forage as well if the current arrangement is (Guard, Forage), which would
drop Bird 1’s fitness but would also drop Bird 2’s fitness, and Bird 2 could
threaten to do the same if the current arrangement is (Forage, Guard).
The threat point is the payoff for both players that results in the best
fitness each could achieve given that they play individually. In this case the
threat point is ( 103 , 6). Based on this threat point one can draw the payoff
polygon given in Figure 1.1.
Everything to the right of and above the dashed lines is hence a better
payoff for both players than the threat point payoff. The negative slope
line from BA to AB, to the upper right of the threat point and cut off at
the dashed line, represents the Pareto-optimal payoff region, or the line on
which no outcome exists that is better for both players, or better for one
player and equal for the other player. This is called the negotiation set. The
Nash Bargaining Solution will be found on this set as the point on the line
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(x, y) which maximizes the product
(x− x0)(y− y0)
where (x0, y0) is the threat point. In this case, the point (5.7, 7.2) is the
Nash Bargaining Solution, corresponding to Bird 1 foraging 518 of the time
and Bird 2 foraging 1318 of the time, respectively.
This is an example of how animals could cooperate and maximize their
payoffs using the Nash Bargaining Solution. It does not explain how they
would arrive at a Bargaining Solution, or why a Bargaining Solution makes
sense. Roughgarden hypothesizes that the Nash Bargaining Solution arises
out of cooperating players trying to maximize their team fitness as defined
above. This would make sense because the team fitness is defined as the
product of the individual fitnesses subtracted by the threat points.
2.3 Conclusion
Roughgarden et al. (2006) hypothesizes cooperation through pleasure, and
defines team fitness in a way that causes individuals to converge to a Nash
Bargaining Solution rather in accordance with the axiomatic approach Nash
developed. She gives no axiomatic derivation of the Nash Bargaining So-
lution in the biological context, nor does she explain the dynamics of how
a team arrives at the Nash Bargaining Solution.
In the next few chapters, I plan to explore
1. The rates of change for the amount of time put into a strategy and
whether they converge to a Nash Competitive Equilibrium or a Nash
Bargaining Solution.
2. How individuals might switch between individual play and team
play.
Chapter 3
Rates of Convergence
In this chapter we examine the rates of change Roughgarden et al. (2006)
gives for individual play and team play. As no justification was given for
the rates beyond stating analogies to coevolution of species, we first test the
rates to verify the correctness, come up with other potential rates that also
lead to the correct solutions, and finally rederive the rates by drawing from
adaptive topography (Wright, 1932). We critique one of the assumptions
that must be made in the derivation of the rates.
3.1 Motivation
Roughgarden et al. (2006) proposed rates of change for individual play and
team play that would explain the evolutionary game dynamics of how a
Nash Equilibrium would be reached in individual play and how a Nash
Bargaining Solution would be reached in team play.
Recall the rates of change:
dpi
dt
=
1
wi(p1, p2)
×
{
∂wi(p1, p2)
∂pi
}
× pi(1− pi).
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dxij
dt
=
1
w1(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)w2(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)
×
{
∂∗[w1(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)w2(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)]
∂∗xij
}
× xij(1− xij).
The motivation behind these are the coevolution of species and Fisher’s
Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. (Fisher, 1930) However, there
is otherwise no justification of the motivation behind the rates of change in
strategy partitioning, nor any proof of why they lead to the Nash Compet-
itive Equilibrium or the Nash Bargaining Solution.
3.2 Testing Rates of Convergence
Since there was no justification of these rates, we first tested them. To do
so, we simulated individual play and team play in Python.
We made four functions for both individual and team play. The first cal-
culated the average fitness accumulation rate for individual i given p1, p2
and the payoff matrix W. The second calculated the rate of change for pi or
xij according to the formula above, given p1, p2, the payoff matrix W, and a
time step.
The main function of the script calculated the value the game converged
to as well as the equilibrium (p1, p2). Its inputs were the initial values of
p1, p2, the payoff matrix W, and the time step to be taken.
At discrete time intervals, the players would adjust the proportion of
time they put into playing different strategies. This continued until the rate
of change became 0; at this point their average fitnesses had converged.
The final function plotted the fitnesses to which the different values con-
verged.
3.3 Individual Play
Individual play was simulated in Python. The rates of change lead fitnesses
to converge to the Nash Competitive Equilibriums at very small steps, such
as 0.0001 (Table 3.1). However, at larger time steps such as 0.1, the fitnesses
did not converge to a Nash Competitive Equilibrium.
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Figure 3.1 Individual play, converged average fitness accumulation rate, time
step = 0.0001.
3.3.1 Given Rate
We entered the same payoff matrix as from Table 1.1, with starting values
of p1 and p2 from 0 to 1 by 0.1 increments. We used a time step of 0.1. The
converged fitness values are given in Figure 3.2.
We also tested a zero-sum payoff matrix, (a game where one player
loses as much as the other gains) with a single Nash Equilibrium at (3,−3),
given in Table 3.1. The converged average fitness accumulation rates for
Player 2 are given in Figure 3.3.
a. Player 1 b. Player 2
Figure 3.2 Converged average fitness accumulation rate, Straffin example.
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A B
A (5, -5) (3, -3)
B (-2, 2) (0, 0)
Table 3.1 Zero-sum payoff matrix.
Figure 3.3 Converged average fitness accumulation rate for Player 2, zero
sum.
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Figure 3.4 Converged average fitness accumulation rate, rate of change partial
only, Straffin example.
3.3.2 Testing Other Rates
Originally, the rates of change Roughgarden gives did not lead to the Nash
Equilibrium, as we were using time steps of 0.1. Since they did not con-
verge, we tested two other possible rates of change with the payoff matrix
from Table 1.1,
dpi
dt
=
∂wi(p1, p2)
∂pi
and
dpi
dt
=
1
wi(p1, p2)
∂wi(p1, p2)
∂pi
.
We used the same starting values of p1 and p2 from 0 to 1 by 0.1 incre-
ments as above. We used the same time step of .1. The converged fitness
values for only the partial are shown in Figure 3.4. Note that the average fit-
ness accumulation rates converge to the Nash Equilibrium no matter what
value of p is used.
The converged fitness values for Player 1 for the partial multiplied by
1
wi(p1,p2)
are given in Figure 3.5. Note that the average fitness accumulation
rates also converge to the Nash Equilibrium no matter what initial value of
p we start with.
It is clear that the average fitness accumulation rate converges to the
Nash Equilibrium when the rate of change is both just the partial and when
the rate of change is 1wi(p1,p2) ×
∂wi(p1,p2)
∂pi
. This raises the question of why
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Figure 3.5 Converged average fitness accumulation rate, (1/Fit)× Partial,
Straffin example, Player 1.
Roughgarden chose to make use of the rate that she did rather than the
partial or the partial divided by the average fitness.
3.4 Team Play
The code for team play has a few additional subtleties. First, the partial
given for team play is a directional derivative that changes all the state
variables in unison to maintain a total sum of one. In other words, as
∂∗[w1(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)w2(xAA, xAB, xBA, xBB)]
∂∗xij
the three other state variables x(1−i)j, xi(1−j), x(1−i)(1−j) change in the other
direction as a block to preserve the total sum of 1.
In terms of modeling and simulation, we decided that the time alloca-
tions would be changed in proportion to the time allocation they already
have. For example, if the rates were
xAA = 0.4, xAB = 0.2, xBA = 0.1, xBB = 0.3,
Derivation of Roughgarden’s Individual Fitness Accumulation Equation 21
then if xAA is changed by 0.1, then xAB = 0.2− 0.1× ( 0.20.6 ), xBA = 0.1− 0.1×
( 0.10.6 ), and xBB = 0.3− 0.1× ( 0.30.6 ). This block change would only occur and
be added after all the rates for xij had been calculated.
After making the time step for the team play code 0.001 as well the team
play rates led to the Nash Bargaining Solution. However, two things are of
note:
1. The rate only works for those starting xij values that lead to positive
average threat-point moderated fitnesses for both player, or starting
values that cause the average fitness of the players to be above the
threat point in the upper right corner of the payoff polygon.
2. If we take the absolute value of the term 1w1w2 then we still achieve the
Nash Bargaining Solution in some cases where the starting xij values
do not give average fitnesses in the upper right corner of the payoff
polygon, such as x =
[
[0.2, 0.3], [0.4, 0.1]
]
. However, in other cases the
starting xij values do not converge to the Nash Bargaining Solution.
3.5 Derivation of Roughgarden’s Individual Fitness Ac-
cumulation Equation
Roughgarden et al. (2006) claims that the individual fitness accumulation
equations are analogous to coevolution of species:
“These equations resemble coevolution between two species,
each with one haploid locus containing two alleles. Here, the
notion of a ‘seconds pool’ replaces that of a gene pool, prof-
itable seconds beget more profitable seconds with haploid in-
heritance, and the time-allocation variables change as each in-
dividual climbs their own adaptive surface, by analogy to the
adaptive topography metaphor of population genetics.”
The key idea behind these equations is the Fundamental Theorem of
Natural Selection, first explicated by Fisher (1930), then elaborated on by
Price (1972). Modified versions of the theorem abound, as well as opinions
about whether the theorem holds true or not. Nevertheless, Roughgarden
adapts a version of this theorem to generate her fitness accumulation rate
equations. We derive her individual rate below. The team rate has a similar
derivation, but with a single species and four alleles instead.
We draw from adaptive topography for this derivation. Adaptive to-
pography is a branch of evolutionary theory backed by the idea that natural
22 Rates of Convergence
selection uses the genetic variation in a population to produce individuals
that are adapted to the environment. In adaptive topography, the funda-
mental theorem of natural selection is
∆p =
pq
w¯
(
1
2
)
dw¯
dp
.
We will consider p1 without loss of generality. Let w¯ = Wi(p1, p2) =
p1p2wAA + p1(1− p2)wAB + (1− p1)p2wBA + (1− p1)(1− p2)wBB. Then
∂Wi(p1, p2)
∂p1
= p2wAA + (1− p2)wAB − p2wBA − (1− p2)wBB.
Wright (1932) showed that if p is the frequency of the allele A and q =
1− p is the frequency of allele a in a haploid locus with two alleles, then
pt+1 =
(
ptwAA + qtwAB
w¯
)
pt,
so
∆p = pt+1 − pt =
(
ptwAA + qtwAB
w¯
)
pt − pt.
This derivation stems from the fact that the frequency of A alleles in the
population at t+ 1 is the number of As in the gamete pool divided by the
total number of gametes produced, which is equivalent to the frequency of
A alleles in the population at time t multiplied by the respective genotype
fitnesses divided by the total fitness. Unfortunately, we cannot quantify the
frequency with which players play strategy A in such a manner.
However, we conjecture that similar to Wright’s equation, the frequency
with which player 1 plays strategy A at t+ 1 will be the amount of fitness
player 1 accumulates by playing strategy A over the total fitness accumu-
lation:
p1,t+1 =
p1,tp2,twAA + p1,t(1− p2,t)wAB
w¯
.
If this holds true, then
∆p1 = p1,t+1 − p1,t
=
[
p2,twAA + (1− p2,t)wAB
Wi(p1, p2)
]
p1,t − p1,t
=
p1,t
Wi(p1, p2)
× [p2,twAA + wAB − p2,twAB − p1,tp2,twAA
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−p1,t(1− p2,t)wAB − (1− p1,t)p2wBA − (1− p1,t)(1− p2,t)wBB]
=
p1,t
Wi(p1, p2)
[wAA(1− p1,t)p2,t + wAB(1− p1,t)(1− p2,t)
− (1− p1,t)p2,twBA − (1− p1,t)(1− p2,t)wBB]
=
p1(1− p1)
Wi(p1, p2)
[p2wAA + (1− p2)wAB − p2wBA − (1− p2)wBB].
Note that the term on the end is exactly the partial derivative of Wi(p1, p2)
with respect to p1. Hence our equation becomes:
∆p1 =
p1(1− p1)
Wi(p1, p2)
∂Wi(p1, p2)
∂p1
.
3.6 Questions and Criticisms
Other rates of change lead to a Nash Equilibrium, such as just the partial of
the average fitness ( ∂W∂pi ) or the partial divided by the average fitness. Other
rates of change also lead to a Nash Bargaining Solution. The question then
is: why the particular rate that Roughgarden has chosen to give? What is
the justification for it?
While the rate she gives is analogous to coevolution between two species,
it seems questionable that we can make such an analogy to individual gen-
eral fitness from gametic fitness. Although both are driven by natural selec-
tion, one is quantifiable in the number of alleles produced, while the other
is not. How can this anomaly be resolved? Would it make more sense to
understand these rates and fitnesses as acting on populations? What would
be the relationship between individual behavior and population behavior?
In addition, is it sensible for the team play rate to only work for those
strategy time allocations that fall in the upper right side of the polygon?
Could it not be conceivable that the team starts playing somewhere else in
the polygon, and learn to play the Nash Bargaining Solution as well?
Finally, how do individuals switch between competition and coopera-
tion? We explore this question in the next chapter.

Chapter 4
Switching Between Individual
Play and Team Play
In this chapter we try to understand how players switch between individ-
ual and team play. Roughgarden cites a series of papers on hybrid system
theory as a framework for the dynamics of switching between individual
play and team play (see Tomlin et al., 2003). Hybrid system theory is the
modeling, analysis and control of systems interacting between discrete and
continuous state dynamics. An example of this would be airplane autopilot
modes: a pilot would want to switch between discrete modes of autopilot
controls based on continuous feedback. Hybrid system theory can be ap-
plied to social selection because individuals will switch between team play
and individual play based on continuous rates of change in strategy time
allocation. However, no such model as applied to social selection has been
given, and hybrid system theory does not explain evolution between dis-
crete states such as individual play and team play.
We develop a model for switching between team play and individual
play. Another model that is influenced by Tomlin et al. (2003) is described
in Chapter 5; there are technical coding problems with the model that have
not made it testable yet. We also address the assumptions made in this
particular model and its limitations along with possible future directions.
4.1 Probabilistic Model
Suppose two players play as a team a% of the time, and as individuals
1− a% of the time. When their style of playing improves upon their fitness,
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they increment the proportion of time they play that style by a variable
chgAmt.
4.1.1 Assumptions
• Playing as a team only requires one player realizing they can achieve
a better fitness as a result of playing as a team. This is because that
player can use the threat point to get the other individual to cooper-
ate.
• When we had playing as a team require that both players decide to
play cooperatively as opposed to only a single player, players always
ended up playing competitively the entire time by the end. The idea
was that it should be harder to get two individuals to agree on a set
of strategies than for each of them to make their own choices, but it
did not lead to interesting results, as in the payoff matrix we used it
was never advantageous for Player 2 to cooperate.
• Players retain knowledge of the fitness benefits they accrued from the
last time step.
4.1.2 The Pseudocode
Given a vector p that represents the proportion of time players 1 and 2 play
strategy A, a 2× 2 matrix x that represents the proportion of time the team
jointly plays AA, AB, BA, BB, a fitness matrix W, a time step, and an initial
proportion of time players play cooperatively a, and some constant change
amount b, the psuedocode
for each time step up to t=100000:
choose team play with prob = a,
individual play with prob = 1 - a
change a by chgAmt according to whether style of
playing improves either player’s fitness or not
if a becomes either 0 or 1: break
4.2 Results
We ran the code with a fixed x and fixed chgAmt while varying p and the
initial team play proportion. For x, we fixed it at the Nash Equilibrium,
Results 27
0 0
1 0
a. Nash Equilibrium
0 518
13
18 0
b. Nash Bargaining
0.2 0.3
0.5 0
c. Additional Point
Table 4.1 Specific x values used for analysis.
Player 2
A B
Player 1
A (2, 6) (10, 5)
B (4, 8) (0, 0)
Table 4.2 Straffin two-by-two matrix (Straffin, 1996).
Nash Bargining Solution, and a random point in the playoff polygon that
was not on the boundary. The three x values tried are in Table 4.1.
For chgAmt, we fixed it at 0.1, 0.01, 0.001, and 0.0001. Our fitness matrix
was Table 1.1.
We include two kinds of graphs here for each of the three xs. One was
varying p by 0.1 (for both players, as in p = [0.1, 0.1], p = [0.2, 0.2], etc.)
and varying the initial starting team play proportion by 0.1, and plotting
the final team play proportion (Figures 4.2 and 4.5). This was not done for
all values of chgAmt and x, as the purpose was mostly to see whether there
was a middle region for the final team play proportion after ten time steps
that did not converge to all competitive play or all team play.
The other was plotting the trajectory of the proportion of time players
played as a team as time went on, with p = [0.5, 0.5] and p = [xAA +
xAB, xAA+ xBA], or the aggregate of the proportion of time each player was
playing strategy A in x (Figures 4.1 and 4.6). Some graphs only feature
p = [0.5, 0.5] or p as the aggregate, as there did not seem to be significant
differences in team play proportion trajectories based on p. This is not sur-
prising, given that p remains independent from cooperative play dynamics.
4.2.1 Nash Equilibrium
The team proportion always converged very quickly to either 1, all team
play, or 0, all competitive play. The range where it was not clear whether
team play would converge to 1 or 0 became smaller and smaller as chgAmt
got smaller as well (Figure 4.1).
When we varied p by 0.1 (for both players, as in p = [0.1, 0.1], p =
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Figure 4.1 Time vs. teamProp, Nash Equilibrium.
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Figure 4.2 p, initial teamProp vs. final teamProp, chgAmt=0.0001, Nash Equi-
librium.
[0.2, 0.2], etc.) and varied the initial starting team play proportion by 0.1,
we discovered that below ∼0.45 players ended up playing competitively
the entire time, and above ∼0.45 players ended up playing cooperatively
all the time (Figure 4.2).
4.2.2 Nash Bargaining Solution
The team proportion converged very quickly to 1, all team play, or 0, all
competitive play for chgAmt < 0.0001. (Figure 4.3a) For chgAmt = 0.0001,
there was a narrow window between 0.4 and 0.5 where it wasn’t clear
whether there would be convergence or not (Figure 4.3b).
When we plotted the trajectory of the team play proportion against
time, we saw the same results: for chgAmt < 0.0001, the team play pro-
portion converged to 0 or 1 quickly, and for chgAmt = 0.0001, there was
a window between 0.4 and 0.5 where there was no clear convergence (Fig-
ure 4.4).
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a. chgAmt = 0.001 b. chgAmt = 0.0001
Figure 4.3 Initial teamProp vs. final teamProp, x = Nash Bargaining Solution.
4.2.3 Additional Point in Payoff Polygon
Here we tested different ChgAmts for the same point in the payoff polygon,
x =
[
[0.2, 0.3], [0.5, 0.1]
]
.
ChgAmt = 0.01
When we varied p by 0.1 (for both players, as in p = [0.1, 0.1], p = [0.2, 0.2],
etc.) and varied the initial starting team play proportion by 0.1, we discov-
ered that below ∼0.35 players ended up playing competitively the entire
time, and above ∼0.35 players ended up playing cooperatively all the time
(Figure 4.5).
That same divide is reflected in the plots of the trajectory of the propor-
tion of time players played as a team as time went on, with p = [0.5, 0.5]
and p = [xAA + xAB, xAA + xBA], or the aggregate of the proportion of time
each player was playing strategy A in x (Figure 4.6).
ChgAmt = 0.0001
For ChgAmt = 0.0001, when we varied p by 0.1 we discovered that there
was a narrow window between 0.4 and 0.5 where the final team play pro-
portion was not either 0 or 1, that if the initial starting team play propor-
tion was less than 0.4 the players ended up playing competitively the entire
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c. p=(0.5, 0.5), chgAmt=0.001 d. p=(0.5, 0.5), chgAmt=0.0001
Figure 4.4 Time vs. teamProp, Nash Bargaining.
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Figure 4.5 p, initial teamProp vs. final teamProp, chgAmt=0.1.
a. p=(0.5, 0.5) b. p=aggregate
Figure 4.6 Time vs. teamProp, chgAmt = 0.01.
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Figure 4.7 p, initial teamProp vs. final teamProp, chgAmt = 0.0001.
time, and if it was greater than 0.5 the players ended up playing coopera-
tively the entire time (Figure 4.7).
When we plotted the trajectory of the proportion of time players played
as a team as time went on, we discovered the same thing (Figure 4.8). If
the initial team proportion was less than 0.3, then players played compet-
itively the entire time. If the initial team proportion was greater than 0.5,
then players played cooperatively the entire time. At 0.4 it was not clear
whether the play would converge or not, even after 100,000 adjustments.
There was also a curious kink for the trajectory of team play proportion if
the initial team play proportion was at 0.5, 0.4, or 0.3 that is not present in
other starting proportions of team play. It remains to be seen as to why that
is.
4.2.4 Limitations
• The adjustment of playing styles should not change by a fixed amount;
that seems erroneous, and also the probability of players ever playing
other strategy styles becomes extinguished.
• The proportion of time players play strategies A and B in individ-
ual play and jointly AA, AB, BA, BB in team play should inform each
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Figure 4.8 Time vs. teamProp, chgAmt = 0.0001, steps=100,000.
other. It is not likely that these are completely independent of each
other.
• The decision as to when the proportion of time allocated to certain
strategies was adjusted was made arbitrarily.
4.2.5 Possible Expansions
• Allow p to depend on x in some way.
• Allow some “trust” factor into play, where players are less likely to
trust each other after having played competitively for a long time,
and so the amount they adjust their likelihood to play as a team (such
as chgAmt) by is proportionally lower.
4.3 General Directions
In the future, it would be interesting to allow p to be based off of x and vice
versa. This is what has been done in the hybrid model described in Chap-
ter 5, but no simulation has been done with it. Afterwards, incorporating
some “trust” factor would be a simple change, given that we already have
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chgAmt set up for the amount one moves towards cooperation or competi-
tion. In a different direction, looking at multichoice or fuzzy games (games
in which there are levels between cooperation, cooperating partially, and
not cooperating at all), and considering the game as a population or with
more than two players may yield worthwhile results.
Our model is applied in Chapter 6 to the Peacock Wrasse as a test of
whether it could explain changes in breeding behaviors in the wrasse.

Chapter 5
Other Models
In this chapter we list two other models that we developed. The first did
not reveal any new information, and the second would be interesting to
explore in depth, but requires more debugging.
5.1 Multi-Armed Bandit
The multi-armed bandit is a problem in statistics, where a player has a
choice between multiple options that each produce a reward with a differ-
ent probability. The objective of the player is to maximize the rewards they
earn through choosing between options. It was originally considered by
Allied scientists in World War II. It was proposed as a possible alternative
to the model above because the players got fixed permanently into playing
competitively because its initial outcome did better than that of playing
cooperatively, which is similar to the dilemma of the multi-armed bandit.
The epsilon-greedy strategy can approximate an optimal sequence: the
player picks the option that gives them the better fitness with 1− e prob-
ability, and the other option (or options) with e probability. In our model,
this means that players pick the playing style that gives them better fitness
with 1− e probability, and the other playing style with e probability.
5.1.1 Results
We have not tested this model thoroughly; originally we tested this model
with the constraint that both players had to benefit positively from team
play in order to continue playing as a team. This lead to the players play-
ing competitively almost the entire time, with the exception of playing co-
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operatively occasionally in accordance with e. This model could perhaps
be tested using the new constraint that only a single player has to benefit
positively from team play in order to continue playing as a team.
5.1.2 Possible Expansions
The bandit model could be incorporated into the probabilistic model, where
the adjustment happens as in the probabilistic model, but players can never
play cooperatively or competitively all the time. Instead the adjustment
could be bounded by e, so that players cannot play cooperatively more
than 1 − e or less than e percent of the time. This was done, however it
did not reveal anything new. This is likely due to the fact that in the bandit
model the proportion of team play still hovers at either e or 1− e; since e
is small, it is unlikely for the proportion of team play to deviate far from
either e or 1− e.
5.2 Hybrid Model
In hybrid system theory, there are models and analyses of systems interact-
ing between discrete and continuous state dynamics (Tomlin et al., 2003).
There exist different continuous systems, with the discrete controlling which
continuous system was in effect. An example of this would be airplane au-
topilot modes: a pilot would want to switch between discrete modes of
autopilot controls based on continuous feedback.
Hybrid system theory can be applied to social selection because indi-
viduals will switch between team play and individual play based on con-
tinuous rates of change in strategy time allocation. However,
Roughgarden et al. (2006) referenced hybrid system theory as a frame-
work for the dynamics of switching between individual play and team play,
because individuals will switch between team play and individual play
based on continuous rates of change in strategy time allocation. However,
no such model as applied to social selection has been given, and hybrid
system theory does not explain evolution between discrete states such as
individual play and team play. We hence come up with our own hybrid
model for switching between team play and individual play; it is essen-
tially the same as the model from Chapter 4, with one key difference.
In hybrid systems, the state variables between different continuous sys-
tems remain the same, hence a model that was based off of hybrid system
theory would have as its key feature the maintenance of the same state vari-
General Directions 39
ables for each discrete state. This would be reflected in having x be based
off of p, and vice versa. Note that
p1 = xAA + xAB, and p2 = xAA + xBA.
Unfortunately, we cannot derive x from p in the same way. For the pur-
poses of implementing the hybrid model, we set the entries of x as
xAA = p1 × p2,
xAB = p1 × (1− p2),
xBA = (1− p1)× p2,
xBB = (1− p1)× (1− p2).
This was the only change implemented in the hybrid model that was differ-
ent from Chapter 4; at each step, after either x or p was adjusted, the other
state variable was adjusted as well.
Preliminary tests do not show a significant difference between the hy-
brid model and the model where x and p are independent of each other.
However, this model has not been tested in a systematic way.
5.3 General Directions
While first priority is given to refining the model in Chapter 4, if ideas from
alternative models are found to be more salient or realistic, or show signif-
icant differences from Chapter 4 then more consideration will be given to
these other models. In the next chapter we focus on applying Chapter 4 to
a real-world example.

Chapter 6
Peacock Wrasse Example
In this chapter we run our model and the hybrid model on data taken from
studies on the peacock wrasse (Symphodus tinca) to see if our model could
predict potential mechanisms of cooperation occurring in species. Peacock
wrasse are a Mediterranean fish that have relatively well understood strate-
gies for breeding and a distinct breeding season that can be modeled (Lut-
tbeg and Warner, 1999; Pallaoro and Jardas, 2003; van den Berghe, 1990).
Female wrasse choose between spawning with nonnesting males in un-
protected areas, or spawning with nesting males in protected nests. Males
have more strategy choices, from defending nests, (nesting males) search-
ing the sea floor for females to spawn with, (interceptors) gathering around
the edge of a defended nest to rush in whenever females spawned in one,
(satellites) or taking over actively spawning nests then abandoning it to the
defending males (pirates) (van den Berghe, 1988). However, the two main
and most common male strategies researchers tend to focus on are nesting
males and interceptors (Gross and Sargent, 1985), and for the purposes of
this example, we allow only those two strategies for the male as well.
6.1 Introduction
Although individual peacock wrasse mating strategies have been studied
extensively, how parental care or certain nesting strategies develop over the
course of a season is not as well understood. The typical breeding season
for peacock wrasses is from mid-April to mid-June.
Female wrasse provide no care, simply laying their eggs each day of
the breeding season on either the sea floor or in a nest guarded by a male.
They are observed to visit nests attempting to find an acceptable nest; after
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Figure 6.1 Symphodus tinca (peacock wrasse).
a certain period of time they seem to “give up” and spawn out-of-nest. The
relative payoffs of the two spawning options for the female wrasse depend
on the fraction of eggs that hatch when a female spawns with a nesting
or nonnesting male, the probability of successfully finding a nesting male,
and the costs for the female of searching. It appears to be more profitable
to search for and spawn with nesting males early in the breeding season
and less so after mid-season due to a decrease in the availability of nest-
ing males and probabilities of hatching success. One hypothesis of how
females make reproductive decisions is through adjusting their giving up
times, which are affected by their estimates of the probability of success-
fully finding an acceptable nest. Researchers created a model based on this
hypothesis, and found that wrasse that adjusted their probability estimates
based on previous experiences were the most successful at reproducing,
and spawned in nests in proportions most similar to observed.
Male wrasse either provide facultative care, watching over eggs in a
nest of algae and keeping them safe from predators, or provide no care.
Van den Berghe described the progression of a large proportion of wrasse
from no care to full care over the course of a breeding season. It was not
clear how evolution to full care from no care came about, whether it was
due to seasonal changes in terms of costs of providing care, availability of
spawning females, out-of-nest mortality increases, a combination, or some-
thing else.
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6.2 Model
We use our model to see whether some mechanism of communication be-
tween wrasse could also lead to the evolution of in-nest spawning behav-
iors. The parameters the model requires are a payoff matrix, an initial ma-
trix of the proportion of time players play strategies jointly, an initial matrix
of the proportion of time players play strategies independently, and an ini-
tial probability of playing as a team.
We used six different payoff matrices to represent the different periods
of the roughly 90-day season: 10 day, 25 day, 40 day, 55 day, 70 day, and
85 day. For each of these days, we set the proportion of team play as the
probability that a female wrasse successfully finds a suitable nest.
The initial matrix of the proportion of time players play strategies jointly
is informed by the proportion of females spawning in nests and the propor-
tion of males spawning in nests. These values were taken to be the initial
matrix of the proportion of time players play strategies independently; the
initial matrix of the proportion of time players play strategies jointly was
then extrapolated as
xAA = p1 ∗ p2,
xAB = p1 ∗ (1− p2),
xBA = (1− p1) ∗ p2,
xBB = (1− p1) ∗ (1− p2).
All of the initial parameters are in Table 6.1.
If only cooperation was in force, then the wrasse would all be spawn-
ing in nests. If only competition was in force, then two of the Nash equi-
libria are search-broadcast and stay-deposit; there may be others as well.
However, as wrasse are observed to both spawn in nests and out of nests
throughout the season, some other mechanism must exist that allows for
multiple strategy pairs. We predict that our model will allow for wrasse
to competitively play search-broadcast together near the beginning of the
season, cooperatively and competitively play stay-deposit mid-season, and
competitively play search-broadcast again near the end of the season.
6.3 Results
When we ran the models with the inputs listed in Table 6.1 we found that
results were as expected. However, levels of cooperation were not high.
The trends are shown in Figure 6.2.
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a. Day 10 b. Day 25
c. Day 40 d. Day 55
e. Day 70 f. Day 85
Figure 6.2 Progression of proportion of team play over season.
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Payoff Matrix x p teamProp
(1, 1) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (2.5, 2)
0.72 0.08
0.18 0.02
[0.80, 0.90] 0.17
(1.5, 1.5) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (4, 3.2)
0.50 0.30
0 0.20
[0.80, 0.50] 0.19
(1.7, 1.7) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (7, 5.6)
0.275 0.275
0.225 0.225
[0.55, 0.50] 0.22
(3.5, 3.5) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (9.5, 7.6)
0 0.25
0 0.75
[0.25, 0] 0.24
(5, 5) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (14, 11.2)
0 0.35
0 0.65
[0.35, 0] 0.24
(4, 4) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (14, 11.2)
1 0
0 0
[1, 1] 0.13
Table 6.1 Data Used For Wrasse.
6.4 Discussion
In our model, the wrasse develop from playing competitively search-broad-
cast to cooperatively playing stay-deposit and competitively playing search-
broadcast, to competitively playing stay-deposit, and finally to competi-
tively playing search-broadcast. This follows the general trajectory of breed-
ing strategies for the male and female peacock wrasse, which suggests there
may be mechanisms of cooperation and communication that act to cause
peacock wrasse to switch strategies.
At Day 10, a small proportion of wrasse play cooperatively, leading to
the stay-deposit pair of strategies, and a large proportion of wrasse play
competitively, leading to the search-broadcast pair of strategies. At Day 25,
a larger proportion of wrasse play cooperatively, leading to the stay-deposit
pair of strategies, but the rest of the wrasse still play competitively, leading
to the search-broadcast pair of strategies. At Day 40, the largest proportion
of wrasse played cooperatively with stay-deposit; however the rest of the
wrasse were also playing stay-deposit, but competitively.
Days 55, 70, and 85 were turning points, where wrasse were playing
competitively the entire time, first at stay-deposit, then later at search-
broadcast. One reason for the change from Day 40 to Day 55 could be that
since all wrasse were playing stay-deposit at that point, there was no more
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incentive to cooperate. As the season progressed, males stopped building
nests, hence strategy play went to search-broadcast.
More research needs to go into what exactly are appropriate inputs and
why, as well as understanding whether the model is an appropriate repre-
sentation of wrasse breeding strategies throughout the season. In addition,
while the model follows the general trajectory of breeding strategies, their
initial inputs of x and p were already following the general trajectory of
breeding strategies, hence the results of the model could simply be a re-
flection of the initial inputs. Finally, since the proportion of cooperation
was so low, it cannot be concluded that cooperation is ever a significant
mechanism leading to the strategy stay-deposit for the wrasse. In this par-
ticular model, since stay-deposit is a Nash Equilibrium as well as a Nash
Bargaining Solution, the wrasse could have arrived at stay-deposit through
competition as well. Perhaps a different model where the Nash Bargaining
Solution is not the same as a Nash Equilibrium would be more revealing.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Roughgarden’s model of social selection hypothesized that evolution oc-
curs on two tiers: one where selection acts on genes, and one where indi-
viduals change behaviors through mechanisms of competition and cooper-
ation (2006). These mechanisms are rooted in game theory and ideas of the
Nash Equilibrium and Nash Bargaining Solution.
Although Roughgarden et al. (2006) describes the rates of change for
playing competitively and cooperatively, and our testing confirms that they
correctly lead to the Nash Equilibrium and the Nash Bargaining Solution,
they are not sufficiently justified. Although we have rederived the rates
from Wright (1932), the derivation requires the assumption that strategy
selection can be quantified in the same way that allele number can be quan-
tified, which is not a reliable assumption to make.
Roughgarden et al. (2006) also does not describe how individuals would
switch between playing competitively and playing cooperatively. We cre-
ate a probabilistic model in Chapter 4 that would account for this switch
and test it on Symphodus tinca, the peacock wrasse, breeding strategies us-
ing data from papers by Luttbeg and Warner (1999); Pallaoro and Jardas
(2003); van den Berghe (1990). We also created other models using ideas
from the multi-armed bandit and hybrid systems theory (Tomlin et al.,
2003); these other models were not significantly different from the model
from Chapter 4, so we did not pursue them further.
We expected the competition and cooperation proportions as well as
strategies to change over the breeding season in a similar trajectory to that
observed in the wrasse. While the model gave results that were in concor-
dance with our predictions, the proportion of cooperation was very low,
suggesting that cooperation may not be a significant mechanism in strat-
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egy changes. In fact, because we changed the inputs to the model to reflect
the seasonal changes in egg hatching probability and nesting availability, it
could be possible that the model simply reflects the different inputs rather
than predicts a similar trajectory of strategy changes.
Future work could include deriving rates for competitive play and co-
operative play that do not rely on assumptions of being able to quantify
strategy allocation proportion. The model could also use more refinement,
with more generalized conclusions drawn. A deeper understanding of the
model as well as the peacock wrasse would lead to a more conclusive un-
derstanding of whether the model can suggest cooperation and bargaining
as a mechanism through which individuals within a species such as the
wrasse switch behaviors, which is its ultimate goal.
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